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FROM AID TO INDUSTRY: 
A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
EDUCATION IN AUSTRALIA 
RIC MEADOWS 
Introduction 
The history of international students in the Australi an education 
system goes back at least until the early twentieth century, but it 
was only from the inception of the Colombo Plan for Cooperative 
Development in South and Southeast Asia in 1951 that a discussion 
began in the Australian community about the place of international 
students in schoo ls and tertiary institutions. Internationa l students, 
mo re often called 'overseas' students before 1990, were an important 
part of Australian universities in the 1950s a nd 1960s and more 
so because the wider society was essentially monocultural. With 
the growth in private students in the 1970s and then the rapid 
expansion of numbers with the introduction of the full-fee program 
from 1986, international students became a very common sight 
in most Australian educational institutions. Indeed, the opening 
to trade in educational services which the recruitment of full-fee 
international students represented constituted the most tangible way 
in which schools, co lleges and universities participated in the larger 
economic and social movement of the period bundled up in the 
te rm 'internationalisation' . The institutions took the lead from the 
Government's change of policy in 1985 and achieved outstanding 
results in a remarkably short space of time. By this program alone 
Australian educational institutions forged a practical public diplomacy 
on which the Australian Government has been able to build . 
This chapter provides an overview of the history of international 
education in Australia. As such, it necessarily includes references to 
Australian Government policies and the role they played in shaping 
international education in Australia. The focus in this chapter is on 
the impact of these policies. C hapter 4 provides more detail on these 
policies and the rationale underpinning them. 
The earliest period 
Australia's educational institutions were not an obvious choice 
for students from Asia prior to World War II. For one thing, most 
of Asia was colonised and, to the extent that Asian elites were 
educated overseas, the institutions of the colonising powers were 
a more obvious choice. Moreover, Australian universities were sti ll 
in their infancy; there was fo r instance, no PhD in any university 
un til 1945 when the Universi ty of M elbourn e created the first 
in the cou ntry (Macintyre & Selleck, 2003, p 100). It shou ld 
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be noted, however, that the DLitt and the DSc were available in 
specific disciplines in some universities much ear lier. Sir Ragunath 
Paranjpye, the fi rst Indian High Commissioner to Austra lia, noted rchtvr;~ of Australia 
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I n LY 
C0:\1MON\VEALTH OF AUS fRALIA. 
II>MB AND TERRITORI:EZ DEPARTMENT . 
XXTX'X I X X I X I X*'* X I X II* I & X X X X I K 111, X X 
MELBOUIRNE. 6th Oct ober, 1921 . 
The Vice-Chancellor, 
Adelaide Uni vers ity , 
ADELAIDE. S . A. 
Dear Sir, 
Mr. J. B. Ril«r, an Education Officer, 
from Baarah, Iraq, Meaopo~am1a. who ia at present on 
a 1'Un t1J 111~. stat eo t h 1:1t he htlB been askeO. 'o~ 
the anthorities in Iraq to ascertain if the Common-
wealth Government will be prepared to admit into 
Australia upwards of ten students, of good oharaoter, 
from Iraq per annum for the purpose of higher or 
t eohnioal education, provided the Iraq Government sent 
them on Government eoholarehipa or g ave an assurance 
that t hey had adequate private resources to pay for 
then ea:uo6t-to.a and. their return to Iraq. 
2. Mr. Riley further states that he 
has interviewed you in regard to this matter and that 
you were disposed to look very favourably on t he idea 
of affording opportunities for some of these students 
to study at your Un~.versity. The JJinis t er, before 
deciding whet her aut hority should. be given for the 
admission of these students into Australia, will be 
glad to l earn whether you confirm Mr . Riley's st at 001en 
and whe ther you desire to offer any remarks on the 
sub ject. 
Yours faithfully, 
Secretary . 
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. 0. 21/20295. 24th October, 1921. 
Dear Sir . 
I re gret that I ha VP been unable to reply sooner 
to your letter of October 6th. 
1 entirely corroborate Ur.Riley'a statement aa 
quoted by you. I think this University, together ¥1th 
the School of Mine~ and RosPworthy College , to be very 
I"All equipned for training those l!P.eopotamian s tudents 
in Med icine, mngineering, and Agr iculture. Aga inst 
our advantages there hae to b.e set t lle very oerioua 
dieadvant~ge t ha t the University is without a residential 
college, which would be resnonaible f or their b ehaviour. 
1 think Mr . Ril~y 19 r1 ~flt in ~aking it eAaontial that 
the studen t A should he under re~noneible control. If 
other difficultie~ in the matte r arc ov orcome, however, 
1 shall be hanpy to ~ring tiliA one befo r e the un iversity 
Counoil. 
In my opinion it would be all a ga in to Australia 
if it ~ Un ivcrl'lit iPs we re c:~ough t by t he type of youth in 
1U8Rtion. 
J Q'll • 
Your obedien t SArvant, 
Vice-Chancellor . 
l.'he S<>cre tary, 
Hom e and Tc rritorie~ Department, 
Melbourne. 
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Universi ty of Adelaide correspondence, 1921 
souRcE Universi ty of Adelaide Archives Series 
200, Registrar Files, F1921 /639 
Malayan boys being mel at 
Circular Quay. Sydney. by an 
Ivanhoe Grammar School starr 
member and his wife, 1941 
souRCE Ivanhoe Grammar 
School 
in his repo rts to th e government in 
New Delhi in 1945 that the Australian 
univers ities compared unfavo urabl y with 
Allahabad o r Lucknow which bad more 
eminent people in their academic staff 
(Paranjype, 1 June 1945). Paranjpye was 
in a position to judge. A distinguished 
mathematician he had been Senior 
Wrangler, the student with the highest 
marks in mathematics, a t Cambridge 
and had held a number o f important 
academic positions in India. H e doubted 
the value of sending postgraduate 
students to study in Australia because 
the universities were not active in 
research and essentia lly teaching only 
institutions. In 1946 he wrote to Prime Minister N ehru suggesting that 
professors from India come to Australia so that Australians ' may have a 
better appreciation o f Indian intellect' (Paranj ype, 25 September 1946). 
N o netheless, overseas students were present in Australian universities 
prior to the Colo mbo Plan program. One account has it that the first 
student was in 1904 (Goldring, 1984, p 29), while the University of 
Adelaide received an inquiry about taking students from Mesopotamia in 
1921. Student entry was designed to foster cultural exchange and trade 
with Japan, India and China. M ost of the students who were admitted 
we re the relatives of C hinese residents o f Australia a nd thus student 
entry was mostly the resu lt of pressure from Chinese traders already in 
Aust ra lia. The numbers were small; in 1937 there were o nl y 140 such 
students in Austra li a and in 1940, 225 students. M ost o f the students 
were at school level althoug h some did go on to study at tertiary level. 
Some of the students were able to stay as assistants in their relatives' 
business, if the employer was entitled to have an ass istant as se t out 
in the immigration regulations (Palfreeman, 1967, pp 8 & 40- 41). 
Government did, however, control entry of students carefully to prevent 
it becoming a back-doo r means of immjgration to Australia by large 
numbers of Asian residents. 
From 1945, the training needs of countries newly freed from 
Japanese occupation or about to obtain independence became more 
pressing. Paranjpye, for instance, was asked to find pl aces in sui table 
institutions for India n students. By 1946 fourteen Indian students 
were studying geology at the University o f M e lbourne. Indian students 
we re sent to the Gordon Institute in Geelong to study wool and textile 
technology. In some instances fees were waived by Vice-Chancell ors. 
Nurses were sent to train in hospitals. 
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The Colombo Plan 
The need for something more coordinated was recogn ised even as the 
war was ending. Sir lven Mackay, Australia's first High Commissioner 
to India, proposed a scheme in May 1944 to send Indian students and 
technicians tO Australia for further education. The Indian Government 
even offered to pay (Chapman, 1975, p 297). His idea does not seem to 
have been acted upon in Canberra- there was acute pressure on places 
for returning service personnel- but a number of ideas to encourage 
educational exchange were in the air in the heady days of international 
idealism following the creation of the United Nations organisation. 
Labor supported nationalist movements in Southeast Asia and regarded 
economic deprivation as the cause of instability there (Lowe, 1994) . It 
thought that cooperation between governments in fostering trade and 
aid would make the ground less fertile for communist insurrection. The 
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Dr John Burton, drove 
much of the thinking o n this. In preparation for the fi rst meeting of 
foreign ministers of the British Commonwealth in Colombo in January 
1950, Burton had h is department draw up briefing papers on Austra lia's 
relations with its immediate north. These stressed the growing inter-
depend ence betwee n Austra lia and the wider region a nd the importance 
of economic and techni cal ass istance in he lping to establish stable and 
moderate govern ments as the colonial powers withdrew. 
The Libe ral/Coun try Pa rty had been critical of Labo r 's 
in ternationa list views while in opposi tion. In genera l it saw communism, 
rather than economi c deprivation, as the root cause o f the growing 
agitation in South east Asia . Elected to government in December 1949, its 
first international act was attendance at the Colombo meeting in J anuary 
1950. Percy Spender represented Austral ia armed with Burto n's briefing. 
The meeting was not called to discuss an aid program as such. Spender 
wanted to discuss communism, policy towards the newly formed People's 
Republic of C hina as well as the economic and securi ty needs of the 
region. He had in mind the needs of Indonesia, not a Commonwea lth 
country, and so one of his overriding aims was to involve the United 
States in future planning and a ny aid commitments, a lthough this was 
not achieved until 1951. During the course of the meeting several 
proposals were advocated for long-term assistance to the countries of 
the region, but the creation of what came to be called the Colombo Plan 
Consultative Committee was charged with putting flesh on commitments 
to provide credit for productive projects, and to give high priority to the 
region's financial and technical needs. The initial recipients were to be 
Ceylon, India and Pak istan. 
Although Spender was successful in obtaining £13 million as 
Australia's contribution to the aid package, there were constra ints on 
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Occasion of the Commonwealth 
Conference on Foreign Affairs 
111 Colombo, January 1950. 
Front row (1- r): Rt Han Lester 
Pearson (Canada). Rt Han Sir 
Percy Spender (Australia). 
Rt Hon Ghulam Mohamad 
(Pakistan), Shri Jawaharlal 
Nehru (India). Rt Hon OS 
Scnanayakc (Ceylon), Rt Han 
Ernest Bevin (Britain). Sir 
FW Doidge (New Zealand) 
and Rt Hon Philip Noel Baker 
(Britain). Immediately behind 
Mr Senanayake is Hon JR 
Jayewardene (Ceylon). 
SOURCE Colombo Plan 
Secretarint (Sri Lanka) 
what could be p rovided. Austra lia itself needed many of the goods 
that were in sho rt suppl y in the region such as steel, ferti lisers and 
agricultural machinery. Austra lia had wheat flo ur it could supply, but 
at first that was not required. Mo reover, there was firm opposition to 
redirecting Austra lian trade patterns away fro m Europe tO uncerta in 
markets in Asia. Within Austra lia there was a singula r lack o f enthusiasm 
for engagement with Asia in the manner envisaged by the Colombo 
proposals. Newspapers editoria lisecl that whi le being friends with Asia 
was importan t, there was 'no reason to dance to an Eastern piper 's 
tune', whil e in language reminiscent of justifications for the restric tive 
immigrati o n policy, The Bulletin commented that it was fo ll y to imagine 
that Australian activity could have any impact in solving Asia's problems 
(Lowe, 1996, p J 08). 
From the start, the 'technical cooperation program' under which 
students from Commo nwealth countries went overseas to study, 
admini stered by the Department of Extern al Affairs, began to take on 
greater significance fo r Australian aid planners than other aspects of 
the Colombo Plan, a lthoug h mo re was spent on capital a id p ro jects 
(Oakman, 2002, p 89) . By 1955, wheat and machinery had been 
p rovided to the three South Asian members of the Com mo nwealth. 
Repor ts fro m Australian H igh Commissioners were, however, 
unenthusiastic. There was li ttle pub licity associated with the gi fts, and 
they appeared to have little practical impact. Austra li a's contribution 
under the Plan was proportionally less than that of Canada or even New 
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New CoiOiliiHo Plan :.tudt:nls 
being sl lOW11 OllllllfllllhP 
Universny of t\rlo·l ,ooolr: 
campus. Hl!i/ 
sounr.r F 1 • 10 111 I 11: <.111/I'C.Iifl !l 
Of theN 1-a IOnnl /\o <!l llv" " o f 
Austral in 
Zealand. Cabinet remained unenthusiastic too, and Richard Casey, by 
this time External Affairs Minister, found his a id budget was repeatedly 
slashed. Technical cooperation, in contrast to capital aid pro jects, was 
inexpens ive, comparati vely, and appreciated by the universities and it 
had the desirable effect t hat mu ch of the ex penditure was channelled 
back into Austra li a. So, by 1954, over one hundred students had 
come from each of the South Asian countries to study courses such 
as agriculture, engineering and public administration. By October 
1955, when the scheme had been broadened to non-Commonwealth 
countries, a thousand students had been sent to Australia and technical 
experts in town planning, nursing and agriculture had been sent to 
various countries to give advice. The reports from Australian diplomatic 
representatives were, by contrast, encouraging o f the im pact in good will 
Aowing from this work. Walter C rocker, Austra lia 's High Com missioner 
in T ndia, noted in 19 53: 'The on ly political value which Australia has got 
out of its Colombo Plan e ffo rts has been from the students' (Oakman, 
2002, p 91). 
By the middle of 1959 the technical cooperation program had 
grown considerably: some 2650 students, nominated by their home 
governments, had been educated in Australia and some 360 Australians 
had been expert advisors in Asia (Lowe, 1996, p 11 5). Casey saw the 
program as a way of engaging with Asian elites at a formative stage of 
thei r lives, breaking down misunderstandings and prejudices on both 
sides. This had not been foreseen in 1950 but Casey could see the 
public re la tions s ignificance inherent in satisfied returned students. It 
was a risky strategy given the monocu ltural nature of Australian li fe 
57 I FROM A ID TO INDUSTRY 
Sir Arthur Tange, Secretary, 
Department of External 
Affairs. presen ts th e 4000th 
student to come to Austral ia 
under the Colombo Plan, Mr 
Prasit Srivichit from Thailand, 
with a kangaroo hide 
briefcase as a memento of his 
arrival in Australia, 1962 
souRcE From the collection 
of the National Archives of 
Australia 
at the t ime, but in 1956 a former Colombo Plan 
student had become a Cabinet minister in the 
Ma layan Government and Casey was anxious 
that further contact between possible leaders in 
Asia and Austra lian elites be fostered. M oreover, 
the steady growth in numbers throughout the life 
o f the scheme did much to prepare Australia for 
the inevitable end o f its restrictive immigration 
po licy. For their part, Asian diplomats kept closely 
in touch with their stu dents in Australia. While 
highl y critical of Australia's immigration policy, the 
Indian High Commission, fo r instance, regularly 
reported that there was no evidence of prejudice 
against Indians living in the country. 
Colombo Plan students did well academicall y 
and by 1963 their average pass rate was 79 
percent, higher than that achieved by Australian 
stud ents (Oakm an, 2002, p 95). In 1966 the Department of Education 
and Science (DES) in troduced a standardised English language 
compete ncy test for a ll intending overseas students, the Short Selection 
Test, which was to remain in place for over twenty years although 
constantly mod ified. Prior to this the Co mmonwealth Government 
had no means of testing the Eng lish language standard of student visa 
applicants. DES, and irs predecessor the Commonwealth Office of 
Education, was explicitly responsible fo r the welfare of a ll sponsored 
stude nts but there were no clear gu idelines for private overseas students 
(see below). In rime a network of coordinating comminees for overseas 
stud ents was set up to liaise with local communities and provide su pport. 
These did much tO fos ter the strong personal links between sponsored 
students and private citizens which wen: such a featu re of the memories 
of many of the students in later years. Accommodation fo r the growing 
numbers of sponsored students was a constan t prob lem in the early days 
of the scheme. Eventuall y, using Colombo Plan funds, International 
H ouse in Melbourne was built as a place where Aust ra lian and overseas 
students could live and work together. Others were to follow. 
Other sponsored schemes 
The Colombo Plan was not the only scheme bringing overseas students 
to Australia funded by the Australian Government, but it was by far the 
largest. By 1985 some 20 000 students had been sponsored unde r it 
(Oakman, 2003, p 1) alth ough some authoriti es put this figure as high 
as 40 000 (Au letta, 2001 , p 9). Other schemes included the Australia 
Papua New Guinea Education and Training Scheme, the Australian 
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Indonesians study food 
technology at the University 
of Sydney, 1984 
souRCE National Library of 
Austral ia 
International Awards Scheme, the Special Commonwealth African 
Assistance Plan and the Commonwealth Cooperation in Education 
Scheme. In-country training was also provided under the aegis of rhe 
South East Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAM EO), to 
which Australia was admitted in 1973. Australian teachers were sent to 
its Regional English Language Centre in Singapore and to the Regional 
Centre for Science and Mathematics in Penang. 
The most important of the other schemes involved in international 
education and sponsoring students, in the long run, was that of the 
Australian-Asian Universities' Cooperation Scheme (AAUCS) which 
eventually became IDP, the International Development Program. AAUCS 
began after discussions over a period of years between the Indonesian 
Minister for Higher Education, Australia's Ambassador in Jakarta, and 
the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee (AVCC) (Lazenby & Blight, 
1999, p 69). Three professors of agriculture were sent to Indonesia to 
explore possibilities and eventuall y, in 1969, the AYCC exchanged letters 
with the Department of External Affairs to create an inter-uni versities 
body to foster 'the scientific, technical and socio-econo mic aspects of 
food production'. The focus was ini tia ll y on Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Si ngapore, and most of the work was aimed at developing teaching and 
research in plant and animal sciences in specific regional institutions. 
Australian academics took to the scheme with enthusiasm and by 
1976- 77, 84 of them had spent 12.2 person-years 
working in eight universities througho ut Southeast 
Asia and more than half of this time was prov ided 
with no charge to the scheme. The emphasis on 
capacity-bui lding soon required the scheme to 
provide broader based training in English language, 
technician t raining and lab maintenance, basic 
sciences and library services, but the main focus 
was the improvement of graduate staff and by 
1980, 160 postgraduate fellowships had been 
awarded (Lazenby & Blight, 1999, p 71). In 1982-
83, the budget, mostl y by grant from the Australian 
Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB), had risen 
from its initial $0.1 million in 1969-70 to $2.8 
million, or 11 percent of ADAB's expenditure on 
educational aid. By this time, AAUCS had begun 
to expand its work in the Pacific and in Papua 
New Guinea, in particular. In 1981 the name 
was changed, for a brief period as it transpired, 
to the Australi an Universities International 
Development Program (AUIDP). More than the 
name had changed. AAUCS had expanded into 
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educational consultancy work beyond its 'Core Program ' and started to 
win contracts; it was registered with the United Nations Development 
Program, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Kuwait 
Development Fund. Its academic programs had long since moved beyond 
the foundation discipline of food science. By 1982-83, 15 percent of 
the Core Program was devoted to basic science, 13 percent to medicine 
and J J percent each to social sciences, commerce and English language 
training. 
The private student program 
While the Colombo Plan program of sponsored students paid for by 
the Australian Government grew, so too was there a para ll el growth in 
private student numbers from the late 1940s. These students paid loca l 
fees and app lied for their places alongside Australian applicants. M any 
of them came to Australi a to ente r the schools system. Even as early as 
1949 it was recognised that private students needed assistance if they 
were to achieve as well as they might (Lowe & Oakman, 2004, doc. 
43). The program grew steadily without much conscious po licy except 
that gu iding visa issue (Mcgarrity, 2007, p 97). The visa rules permitted 
stud ents as young as ten to enter for study. In the popul ar mind private 
srudenrs were often confused with those sponsored under the Colombo 
Plan but there were five times as many of them and they did not receive 
the sa me level of support (Oakman, 2004, p 179). Their welfare, 
before 1966 when a more explicit policy was introduced, was left to 
the instituti ons. Even in the ea rl y 1950s there was concern about the 
social isolat ion of overseas students and reports of student suicid es and 
unsatisfactory accommodation began to surface . Casey was concerned: 
troubles of this sort might expose the students to comm unist influence 
and thus cut across the aim of the student program in general which was 
to present Austra li a in a positive light (Oakman, 2004, pp 183-184). 
Church and non-government providers moved quickly to provide 
accommodation hostels and developed netwo rks of private homes willing 
to take overseas students. 
The overseas student population expanded during the 1960s; by 
1965 overseas students were five percent of the student body (Oakman, 
2004, p 179). With the retirement of Prime Minister Sir Robert 
Menzies in 1966, modification of the restricted immigration policy 
was successfull y in troduced by the new Mini ster fo r Im migration, 
Hubert Opperman (Mcgarrity, 2007, p 101). As part of his reforms the 
pu rpose of the private overseas stud ent program was explicitly defined 
as increasing the number of qualified people in courses of value in the 
students' homelands. Government welfare serv ices were extended to 
private students, which had the effect of making the distinction between 
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sponsored a nd private students even harder to determine. Stricter 
guidelines on entry meant overseas students could not start before senior 
high school a nd had to be proficient in English to enrol in tertiary study. 
T his requirement stimulated the growth of English language colleges 
with the fi rst such college catering specifically to international students, 
Woods English Teaching Laboratory, established in Sydney in 1965. 
The private program, in particular, grew stead il y in the remainder 
of the decade. In 1966, j ohn Gorton as Minister for Education and 
Science tried unsuccessfully to introduce a quota, which would have 
capped numbers as they were in that year. University Councils opposed 
such a move. Faced w ith pressure over scarce university places, the 
Whirlam Government ( 1972-75) placed a cei ling of 10 000 on numbers 
of overseas private students in universities and dropped any justification 
that the private program and its implied subsidy was a parr of Australian 
development assistance. There were two main criteria for entry to 
Australia: whether the course was available in the intended student's 
home country; and whether the applicant was a genuine student or 
in tending ultimately to app ly for m igration (Gold ring, J 984, p 3 I). 
Departments in Canberra were 
in dispute about the utility of the 
private overseas student program: 
was it simply providing a back door 
to migration or did it fulfil important 
foreign policy objectives? 
The abolition of university fees by the Whi tlam 
Governmen t led to increased demand from 
ove rseas as no student was charged fees from 
Ja nua ry 1974 . T his increased demand, despite 
the Government's bona fi des test, was also dri ve n 
by immigration ex pectatio ns fo ll owing the fina l 
abo li t io n of the last vestiges of the W hite Austra li a 
policy in J 973; in the 1970s some 75 percent 
of private inte rnational students were gra nted 
permanent residence (Gold ring, 1984, p 33). 
By 1979 it was clear that some more conscious 
policy guidelines we re needed for the private 
program. Depar tments in Canberra were in dispute about the uti lity of 
the private overseas s tude nt progra m: was it simply providing a back 
door to migratio n o r did it fulfi l important foreign policy objectives? In 
September 1979 the Fraser Government announced a major restructuring 
of the program Uones, 1986, pp 7 1-77). This introduced the Overseas 
Student Charge (OSC), which, from 1980, imposed an annual fee of 
between $1500 and $2500 depending on the course being studied. 
The overall quota was removed and instead, informal country quotas 
introduced which specified the number of visas available from each 
country each year; in effect this liberalised entry to Australian education. 
A more flexible approach was taken to the spare capacity within 
institutions. They could take students from overseas provided there 
was no significant displacement of Australian students. The program 
was, once again, conceived of in te rms of Australia's aid and foreign 
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policy objectives: ' th e advancement of Australia's inte rests in coun tr ies 
of particular importance to Australia (especially ASEAN, Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), the South Pacific and the Midd le East) by improving 
communicatio n, understanding o f a nd sympathy for Australia's po lic ies, 
and to pro mo te cultura l excha nge' (Goldring, 1984, p 29) . Students were 
required to return ho me o n complet ion of thei r degrees and wait fo r two 
yea rs befo re applying for mig rati o n. In addition, in 1980 a mo re flexible 
approach was adopted towards th e entry o f p rivate secondary stud ents by 
permitting overseas students to apply to ente r junior secondary school. 
T he result o f these changes was considerable growth, fro m 6745 
tertiary and post-secondary students in 1979 to J 3 047 in L984 (but 
no t includi ng students undertaking no n-fo rmal studies such as Englis h 
language, estimated in 1983 at 3050); secondary student numbers also 
grew, fro m 1422 in 1979 to 5 141 in 1984. The ra te of a ppl ication 
for permanent residence dropped roo and by 1983 it was less than 10 
percen t (Goldring, 1984, p 33). The policy changes had coincided with 
the introduction within Brita in o f charg ing full fees for students in 1979 
and part of the g row th in Australian demand ca n be a ttributed to this as 
Australia, even with the OSC, was cons iderably cheaper. 
Inevitably, there were pressures o n institutions and imbalances 
quickly a rose. Some universities o ver-enro lled and some had fa r fewer 
than might have been expected. Some courses were more po pular than 
others : engineering at Monash, for instance, had some 50 percent 
overseas students. l n response ro the demand spurt, the Go vernment 
in troduced a cap on numbers: in 1984 studen ts entering Australia wo uld 
to tal 3500 of which 2000 would be secondary students. In additio n, the 
OSC was steadily increased until it was capped a t 45 percent of the full 
average cost of all courses, at $4666 by 1987. This led to administrat ive 
complexity in DES and in institutions. Several departments were involved 
in the administratio n o f overseas students in Aust ra lia a t a time when 
administra tive cost cutting was importa nt in public policy and there was 
gro wing criticism of the nature of the program. The 'subsid y' , or that 
part o f the fee which was borne by the Australian taxpayer, was counted 
against the aid budget from 1984-85, w hich in that fi nancial year was 
$98 .6 millio n Oo ncs, 1986, p 9). The majo rity of private students were, 
ho wever, ethnically Chinese as they had been since the program started: 
50 percent of total numbers were fro m Malaysia alone and 94 percent 
from the Asia-Pacific region. There was criticis m, shown la ter by the 
Go ldring Committee to be unfounded, tha t the students were rich and 
hard ly in need o f taxpayer assistance. Allegatio ns continued to sur face 
tha t Australian students were missing o ut o n places because overseas 
students were taking them. Universities, in particular, had been forced 
to accept funding cuts since 1975 but the increasing demand fo r places 
was creating unsustainable p ressure o n them. The re was also pressure to 
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increase participation rates in higher education by Australian students. 
Complain ts were made that the private students were under-prepared 
for tertiary study and dragged down the pace of learning at university in 
particular; many o f th ese criti cisms have become a stock in trade of later 
programs. 
Changes to international education 
in the 1980s 
The intermittent discussion in the early 1980s about the aims of the 
private student program, often called the subsidised program, was held 
against a background of changing social and economic circumstances fo r 
Australia. In 1983 th e Labor Government under RJ Hawke was elected. 
Committed to a high growth strategy in the eco nomy and a compact with 
the trade unions to ensure wages increased, it was aware of a g rowing 
current account deficit but did little about it at first. The Austra lian 
economy, long used to the comforts of protectionism, was unable to 
compete with the rest of the world and when commodity prices collapsed 
in the early 1980s, the stage was set for a decade in which Australia 
needed to boost its productivity and its export earnings if its standard 
of living was to be maintained. From February 1985 unti l August 1986 
a newly fl oated Austra lian dollar depreciated by 40 percent. Cutting 
public sector expendi ture, t rying to boost domestic sav ings so that there 
was less borrowing from overseas, and convincing the union movement 
to accept real cuts in wages, were some of the measures put in place to 
make the Australian economy more able to withstand the pressures of an 
increasingly inter-dependent world. 
In addition, in 1984 there was a su rprising debate about the value of 
multiculturalism and the direction of the migration program. Were there 
too many migrants from Asia? Was the immigration program leading to a 
fundamental change in the composition of Australian society? Th e Labor 
Government had signalled its wish for increased Australian involvement 
with Asia, but what would this mean in practice? T he nature of Australian 
aid had been under discussion since the 1970s. The Whitlam Government 
had signalled a desire to direct expenditure to the basic needs of people, 
which included training and education. Lobby groups such as Communi ty 
Aid Abroad and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid emphasised the 
basic needs of the poor as the main focus of aid. In 1975 the Whitlam 
Governmen t brought together aid programs admin istered by various 
government departments, but in particular those of Foreign Affairs and 
Education, into one statutory authority, the Austra lian Development 
Assistance Agency (ADAA). T his signalled a partial move away from an 
aid policy, which had been geared towards achieving Austral ian political 
and diplomatic ends in Asia, towards a policy more broadly conceived 
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in development terms. ADAA did not last lo ng, fo r with the change 
of government in 1975, it was reduced to a bureau - the Australian 
Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) - w ithin the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, where it has remai ned ever since although with subsequent 
name changes and a junior minister within the Foreign Affairs po rtfo lio. 
For some time, short courses and more practical training had been 
growing as an e lement in the sponsored student program. Undergraduate 
sponsorship declined and in practice it was confined to students from 
Oceania. There was considerable growth in the early 'I 980s in sponsored 
The Committee was to look at the hidden 
aid subsidy and recommend the balance 
between the student's cost and that of the 
taxpayer. Encouragement of entry was not 
to be at the expense of Australian students 
and the Committee was asked to consider 
the option of full-cost recovery. 
trainees: more junior and senior leve l officials 
attended courses, termed Development Assistance 
Courses, con ducted at A DAB's International 
Training Institute located in Sydney. Generic 
cou rses in rural develo pment plann ing, media 
management, in-service programs for teacher 
edu cators, were among some of the many offered 
Qones, 1986, p 24). In addition , sho rt courses 
spec ifically designed for the needs of individual 
countries were developed in con junction w ith 
universities and colleges of advanced education to 
provide specia list tra ining for up to three months 
for senior professional staff. Examples included highway engineering 
and mining for Indonesia, advanced English for Thai publi c servants, 
rural development and project planning for the Philippines, and financi~1l 
management for Nigeria. 
Growing pressure on institutions from overseas demand, d ebate 
about the uti li ty in public policy terms o f the subsidised fee, and an 
economy under inc reasi ng strain was, then, the immedia te context for 
the first Parlia mentary review of the private overseas student program 
called by the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in 1983. The 
Committee of Review of Private Overseas Student Policy, chaired by thl' 
Professor of Law at M acquarie University, John Goldring, had wide tcnns 
of reference, including examining how the ad mission of overseas stucknts 
served Austra lia's interests in education, trade, aid policy, immigration, 
and ' inte rnational understanding and cultural exchange' (Goldring, 
1984, p viii). T he Committee was to look at the extent of the hidden ;lid 
subsidy and recommend the balance between the student's cost and rh;ll 
of the taxpayer. Encouragement of entry was not to be at the expensv of 
Austra lian students and the Committee was asked to consi der the ortion 
of full-cost recovery. I t was to examine the fled gling English languaj.\c 
(ELICOS) sector too (see chapter 5). Any recommendations were not ro 
involve add itional public sector outlays and would have to consider dle 
implications for relations with foreign countries. It was, in other words, 
a complete review of the effectiveness of the program. 
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Jackson 'ill( ) ( · , · · 
• .o.u ltl ><J 1,ports 
At the sa me time, a Com mittee to Review the Australian Overseas 
Aid Program had been appoin ted by the Mini ster for Foreign 
Affairs. Its te rms of refe rence required a complete evaluation o f the 
a iel program including its geographic distributi o n; the appropriate 
ba lance between bilateral and multila te ra l a id ; how aiel re lated to 
Austra lia's overal l exte rnal priori ties; and the e ffect iveness of the 
ad ministration o f the program Uackson, 1984, p 245) . Chaired 
by Sir Gordo n jackso n, a promi nent businessperson and member 
of the Board of the Rese rve Bank, th e Committee's task was, in 
other words, to recommend the most effective way of distributing 
the aid dollar. Significantly, Goldring's te rms of reference incl uded 
consul tation with the jackson review. 
Th e Jackson Co mmittee reported a few weeks before Go ldring . 
lt was enthusiasti c about educatio n as a key part of Austra li an 
aid, wh ich it saw as a ll eviati ng poverty thro ug h economic and 
social development. Althoug h it saw a distinction between a id and 
t rade policy, it no netheless no ted that 'a coincidence o f a id and 
commercial interests can be served w ithout sacr ificing the integri ty of 
either ' Uackson, 198 4, p 115) . It recommended a concentration o f 
Australian a id , by g rant, and an expansion o f educationa l assistance. 
It noted that rapidly deve loping countr ies in Asia such as M alaysia 
and Singapore required less a id. 
Importan tl y, and exceed ing its te rms o f 
reference, it call ed for un restric ted entry 
o f overseas students w ho were able to 
pay the full cost of their edu catio n; 
'the overseas student charge sho uld 
gradually be increased to full cost levels' 
Uackson, 1984, p 11). In additi on, 
it recommended that institutions be 
allowed to make their own judgements 
o n the appropriate mix of overseas 
students and collect fees direct ly. It 
was explicit tha t in so do ing it was 
recommendi ng the develo pment of th e 
expo rt po tential of education. This 
would open Australian educatio n to the 
market and lead to g reater e ffi ciency. It 
also recommended tha t the spo nsored 
program continue at the same level but that, in addition, a generous 
meri t scho larship program be introdu ced as well as scho larships 
fo r disadvantaged groups. The money for these programs sho uld 
com e fro m the ex penditure saved as a result of the d ecline in the 
subsidy over t im e, as private students progressively moved to the 
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full-cost program. It recommended that the subsidy be counted as part of 
Australia's aid expenditure from 1984-85. 
The Goldring Committee, on the other hand, recommended against 
a full-cost recovery approach to overseas students, which it said could 
not readily be accommodated within the current Australian education 
system. 'A market-based approach could also upset the many educational, 
cu ltura l, foreign policy and o ther interests which surround the program, 
based as it is on a view of education as a commodi ty ... ' (Goldring, 
1984, p 85). The Committee thought it would be unpopular overseas 
and doubted the capacity of large numbers of students to pay. Instead, 
it reaffirmed the value o f the subsidised program to Australia's wider 
interests and recommended that the Overseas Student C harge continue 
to be levied at a subsidised rate, but in a way that gave intending students 
financial certainty. It recommended a progressive increase in the charge 
to something in the order of 30 to 40 percent of average fu ll cost. It also 
suggested that the population of overseas students within the tertiary 
system should be allowed to grow so that by 1990, 5 to 10 percent of 
all undergraduate students would come f rom overseas; no course should 
have more than 25 percent of overseas students. It a lso recommended 
the creation of an Overseas Student Office to coord inate policy and 
administration of the student program across the public service. 
Creation of the full-fee program 
T he Government was thus faced with two alternative approaches to 
private overseas student entry and established an inter-departmental 
task fo rce to resolve the matter. The result was a compromise. T here 
was pressure in Cabinet to cut expenditure on the subsidy to overseas 
stud ents a nd suggestions that fees fo r Australian students should be 
introduced to enable universities to grow. The Minister fo r Education 
and Youth Affairs, Senator Susan Ryan, resisted this pressu re bu t gave 
way on argu ments favouring Jackson's full cost recovery approach 
for overseas students with the important proviso that there was no 
suggestion that the subsidised program would eventual ly be aboli shed 
(Ryan, 2010, personal communication). Goldring's recommendations, 
then, were largely adopted: the subsidy would progressively be 
increased to 45 percent of the full cost of a place by 1987; an overall 
cei ling of 10 percent of total student numbers and 20 percenr in 
any one course would be introduced; separate quotas for individual 
countries would be set. If the subsidised program could not fi ll the 
demand, courses at full cost for overseas students would be introduced 
and guidelines worked out to take students into mainstream courses. 
The Minister thought the cost would be very high and she doubted, in 
her statement to the Senate, that the cou rses would be internationally 
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competitive (Senate Hansard, 1985, pp 630 & 63 7) . Nonetheless, the 
imposition of a qu ota on intake in the subsidised program, in effect, 
was to encourage the growth in n umbers of full-fee applicants. Lastly, 
an Overseas Student Office (OSO) was created within her portfolio to 
administer the subsidised program and to provide marketing support to 
instituti ons wishing to attract fu ll -fee paying students. 
The new policy was announced on 22 March 1985 by M inister 
Ryan and legislation to enable the implementati on of the policy was 
introduced in to the House of Representatives on 20 November 1985 . 
Th e announcement by the Minister of the offi cial guide lines fo r the 
implementation of t he policy followed in February 1986. 
Thus a new export industry had been created and one that 
represented the fu ture for Australia - services exports in addition to the 
export of primary produce or man ufactured goods. As the Department 
of Trade (1985, p 2) put it, services constituted 73 percent of Australia's 
GNP but only 4 percent of its exports. Its first years were confusing 
as institutions threaded the ir way between the continuing program 
and the new one . The guidelines to instituti ons on how to administer 
full-fe e courses published by the Co mm onwealth Tertiary Education 
Commission (CTEC) ensured that rather than less official involvement 
there was mo re. For instance, all courses and their fe es, directed to full -
fee paying overseas students, had to be approved by CTEC to ensure that 
there was no element o f Comm onwealth subsidy. There were minimum 
indi cative fees set by CTEC including for publi c sector ELICOS colleges. 
A percentage of each fee had to be all ocated to capital ex penditure to 
account for taxpaye r investment. 
T here was uncertainty about what role OSO would play a nd how 
interventi onist it would be in the market. M any of its o fficers were 
uneasy about the likely success of the full-fee program although at senior 
levels there was a commitment to the development of this new export 
market. The sea cha nge in thinking required was considerable fo r those 
on the ground trying to implement policy. Two missions were organ ised 
in 1985 to tes t how extensive the market migh t be in Asia. Led by th e 
Department of Trad e, but including officers from the Department of 
Education and from educati onal institutions, they set out to determine 
the significant areas of demand in key source countries; to recommend 
to government and to institutions appropriate marketing strategies; 
and to inform the market of the changes happenin g in Australi a. T he 
missions were enth usiastic about the potential market, especially in 
Ind onesia and Malaysia but also in Thailand and Hong Kong. They 
recommend ed tha t the CTEC Guidelines shou ld be modified to 'optimise 
the competitiveness of Austra lian edu cati onal courses a nd services 
on overseas markets' (Department of Trade, 1985, p 3 ). Government 
processes such as health screening and visa app lication should be 
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strea mlined; diplomatic posts should make available information from 
providers about education offerings in Australia and assist with inquiries 
about enrolment. The missions' report also called for an urgent review 
of the Short Selection Test and called for a number of English language 
assessment tests to be made available to assist with admission. The 
report call ed for marketing strategies which would involve alumni , and 
suggested that providers would need professional help in developing 
courses and services for overseas stude nts. The ex pected success of the 
new export industry would affect the future of the subsidised program. 
The report also noted th at the ex port of educational services would 
not only contribute ro the edu cation of students in the region but also 
increase awareness of Australi a. In other words, the report laid out 
many of the issues which had to be solved if the full-fee program were 
to become a successful export ind ustry. The close involvement of the 
Department of Trade at this early stage was a pointer to a future in 
which Austrade, the Government's externall y focused trade organisation, 
took the lead in assisting providers to gear up for ex port. As with other 
parts of the government service, as well as the instituti ons themselves, 
it learned on the job, not having ex perience in education services 
marketing. 
The Department of Trade's initia tive in the development o f 
educational services export was fu rther consolidated when the Minister 
for Trade, John Dawkins, replaced Susan Ryan as Minister for Education 
in August '1 987. There was further tinkering wi th the administrat ion 
of the program and in December L988 Dawkins and the Minister for 
Foreign Affa irs, Gareth Evans, announced that the subsidised program 
would be phased out by 1992 and that all new private overseas students 
arriving to start study fro m 1990 would pay full fees. By this point, some 
of th e overseas student charges had reached the full -fee levels of lower 
cost courses in the co lleges of advanced education (wh ich together with 
uni versiti es formed the binary system of tertiary education in ex istence in 
Australia from the 1. 960s to early 1990s). 
Development of the full-fee program 
The full -fee program in tertiary insti tutions graduall y developed 
momentum in numbers: from 255 in 1986, to 622 the next year, 264 1 
in 1988 and 6784 in 1989. The real growth, however, occurred in 
the non-formal sector- business coll eges, English language teaching 
(EUCOS) institutions, and the like. Most of these were pri vately 
owned and thus were always able to charge full fees (discussed more 
full y in chapter 8). From 4284 students in 1986, there were 27 047 
in 1989 (Harris & Jarrett, 1990, p 25) . It is one of the ironies of the 
in ternational student program in Austra lia that any public debate about 
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it has a lways been dominated by its perceived most prestigious sector. 
So, until 1984 'Colombo Pla n' was the blanket term used when most 
students were privately funded; similarly the concerns of un iversities 
continue to dominate public discussion about the full-fee program when 
by fa r the majo rity of stu dents have been in the non-fo rmal sector. This 
rapid growth was facilitated by the ease with w hich it was possible to 
obta in a stud ent visa. Such was the demand tha t by May '1989 there was 
a backlog of 25 000 stud ents from C hina waiting for visas to study and 
the Embassy was struggling to put in place effective screening of the 
bona fid es of applicants (H arris & Ja rrett, 1990, p 51) . Some toughening 
of visa regulations d id li ttle to dampen demand . Many of the students 
wanted to stay as permanent residents and large numbers began to 
overstay their visas. In 1989 some 40 percen t of C hinese ex-students 
were illegall y reside nt. The decision to allow students from China to stay 
in Australia as pe rmanent residents foll owing the massacre in Tiananmen 
Square in June 1989, whatever its mo ral o r political m erits, d id resolve 
the sta tus o f these students. Fu rther tightening of visa regulations soon 
fo llowed to prevent a recur rence of the overstay prob le m a nd student 
numbers began to drop, whi ch destabi li sed many of the coll eges that had 
relied on fees from C hina (M cgarrity, 2007, pp 44- 45). 
Th e TAFE secto r in some states showed entrepreneur ial skill in 
developing ful l-fee markets in countries such as Taiwan and Thail and. 
Victo ria had the considerabl e advantage of having, since J 982, a 
decentralised TAFE sector which meant that each institute of TAFE was 
run by an independent board and could make its own decisions, rather 
than be ing subject to system-wide decisions as was the case in other 
states. Institutes such as Holmesglen and Box Hill moved into the market 
quickly and had success with business programs as pathway programs to 
university ent rance. The institutes in vested heavily in support structures, 
both academic and social, and th is paid dividend s. TAFE had run English 
language programs for migrants fo r many years and so it had a natural 
advantage in language and learn ing support (David En dean, 2010, 
personal communication). 
Independent schools we re active from the sta rt too. Many of 
them had a lways enro lled inte rnational students under the su bsidised 
scheme and via o ther means. They were able to be responsive to 
market conditi ons. The drop in do mestic enrolments that was a resu lt 
o f the recession o f the mid-1980s was offset by increased international 
recruitm ent. Government education systems were active too, but 
hampered, at first, by cent ra lised recru itment and admission processes 
and a tight contro l o n numbers. 
T here were doubts in Australian diplomatic miss ions in Asia about 
whether a n export dri ven approach, without the su bsidised program, 
would work in Australia's interests. The High Com missioner in Kuala 
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Lum pur warned in 1987 against an approach dr iven by profi t and the 
covering of costs and suggested that the strategy shou ld be to gain 
g reater market share and build fo r the long term; were Australia n 
education roo ex pensive srudenrs would move to competitor nations 
such as the UK and the USA. Even with the subsidy Australia 's market 
share of Ma laysia was 24 percent compared wi th 55 percent for the 
USA. Students onl y went in to engineering in Australia because of the 
subsidy. With high costs the High Comm issioner thought the only market 
Australia would have would be business studi es. M oreo ve r, he warned 
that there was a need fo r marketing coordina tio n between providers and 
some overarch ing o rganisation such as the tour ism industry had . If the 
qu ality of what was provided was not constantly being assessed Austra lia 
would lose whatever it might gain. 
Vice-Chancellors also had some doubts about whether the 
Government's strategy would work in the lo ng run. Many of the m had 
ex perience of studying wi th Co lombo Plan students o r had first-hand 
kn owledge of the educat ional development needs of the Asia-Pacific 
arising from their work with AUlDP. The new program was seen as a 
way of encouraging diversity on campus and spreading the benefits of 
host ing overseas students more widely throughout the tertiary system. 
At fi rst the fcc income was simply a very welcome bonus after years 
o f budget cuts; it was mo ney on top of university budgets, not relied 
upon. The bu reaucracy sur rou nding the im plementation of the program 
irrita ted some Vice-C ha ncellors who took the view, even then, tha t more 
devolution of respo nsibili ty for the mix o f students on campus would 
encourage more entrepreneurial act ivity (Ken M cKinnon, 2010, personal 
communication). It was not unti l the early 1990s that many Vice-
Chancello rs started to rely on the income and mai nstream it within their 
budgets. Until that happened, in some universit ies, the internatio nal fee 
income had been used to fund scho larships fo r inte rnational postgraduate 
students, o r for o ther international activities. 
Several universiti es had large numbers of internatio nal students well 
before the int rod uction o f the full -fee po licy. 'New' universities incl uding 
UNSW, established in 1949 at the t ime o f the launch of the Colo mbo 
Plan, and M onash University, establ ished in 1958, were at the fo refront 
in accepting in ternational students including Colombo Plan students. 
UNSW first began welcoming international students in 1952, as its 
founders recognised the opportunity presented by the Colombo Plan to 
enro l fo reign students supported by the Australian Government. By 1960 
the University reported to the Australian Government that LO percent o f 
its student cohort were international students. The cultural and academic 
benefi ts o f international students on campus were recognised early 
and the demand fo r places was high. In some UNSW courses, notably 
architecture and engineering, fore ign students accounted for more than 
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40 percent of enrolments by the 1970s. In the mid-1980s there were 
3500 international students, mainly from Asia, at the University. Monash 
University also set about attracting outstanding students from overseas 
at an early stage; in the period up to the 1985 student policy change, I 0 
percent of irs students were from over eas. (Back et al., 1 996; O'Farrell, 
1999) 
These international studenrs were sponsored by the Australian 
Governmenr under development assistance programs or subsidised 
through inclusion of international students in the calculation of the 
operating grant to the University. With the phasing out of the subsidy 
arrangements from 1990 and the absence of Australian Government 
grants for international students, UNSW, Monash and other universities 
with large international student numbers had to replace many million 
dollars of income by seeking to enrol equivalent numbers of fee-paying 
international students or scholarship- upported students. Monash and 
UNSW were successful in their marketing strategies, having established 
reputations in overseas countries, leading to repeat business as sons 
and daughters, relatives and friends of UNSW and Monash graduates 
enrolled in the universities as full-fee paying sn1denrs. By 1996 RMIT 
and Curtin had joined these rwo universities as those with the largest 
numbers of international students. 
The organisation of an industry 
It was cl ear from the start o f the full -fee program that there was 
potential for bu reaucratic overlap and confusion in the marketplace. 
After all , there were severa l major governm ent departments in vo lved, 
inexperienced institutions starting to test the water overseas, and 
alternative programs to which students might apply. Australian 
diplomatic missions (ADMs) were soon under pressure from inquiries 
and with the large number of non-formal students going for short 
courses there was a high turnover in visa applications. The overstay rate 
of students increased, which put pressure on staff to be more careful 
in checking the students' bona fides: no one wanted this program to 
be a cover for migration. Staffing which had been set up to handle the 
subsidised program could not cope and DEET responded by appointing 
Australia-based staff to missions in Beijing, Hong Kong and Kuala 
Lumpur ; this helped but more was needed. AlDAB (formerly ADAB) 
staff, appointed to handle inquiries for the government-sponsored 
scheme, found they were also handling full-fee matters and Immigration 
officials were trying to deal with increased visa applications. Austrade's 
success in organising trade shows to promote Australian education 
meant its staff were also handling inquiries from potential students and, 
inevitably, in most places, the workload of DFAT staff had increased. 
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Educa tion Minister John 
Dawkins (fourth from left) 
visits the Australian Education 
Centre in Jakarta , 1988 
sounc£ Professor Ken Back, I DP 
Executive Director (1986- 1990) 
Who was to provide counselling o n rhe possible different options 
for study in Austra lia, rest the applicants' language ski lls, lia ise with 
institutions, help complete application forms for admission and then for 
a visa, nor to mention th e testing of the bona fides of applicants? Many 
institutions contracted recruitment agencies, which needed to develop 
trusting relationshi ps with visa authorities in the ADMs; some state 
governments, notab ly Western Australia 
th rough irs comme rcial a rm, known as 
EX IM, set up counselling and placement 
services; and in Kuala Lumpur, the 
Malaysia/Australia Business Council 
funded staff to work in an Australian 
Education Office established within the 
ADM there. l n Bangkok, The Bangkok 
Bank and the Civil Service Commissio n 
provided counselling services. H owever, 
it was IDP, under the new name given 
to AUIDP, which increasingly came 
to be indispensible as a provider of 
informatio n and services to assist 
stude nts through its o ffices overseas 
set up initia lly to facilitate the de livery 
of its aid work. In Jakarta its existing 
office, named an AEC, was contracted 
by DEET to provide a ll the pre-visa 
facil ita tion services for applicants and 
rhe ADM referred inquiri es to IDP. In 
Manila IDP ran an office within the 
ADM although irs work was mainly 
related to lOP's ongoing Core Prog ram 
o f aid work, whi le in Singapore and Hong Kong IDP set up new offices 
focused on information for overseas stude nts and representing its 
institutional clients. IDP offices in other countries in Asia and the Pacific 
followed. As a part of the AVCC and as a partner with AIDAB, TOP had a 
quasi-official status and this gave it a market advantage. 
Responding to the pressure, DEET set up a task force to recommend 
the appropriate balance between government and institutions, their 
representa tives and other service bodies in the administration of the 
program overseas. The task force concluded that in most posts overseas 
sta ff could provide basic information and then refe r the inquirer to 
an agent o r the institution; this wou ld be on a cost-recovery basis to 
institutio ns. In hig h demand posts it thought 'Australian Education 
Centres' (AECs) should be created to g ive a comprehensive service 
outsid e ADMs and to give Australian education an identifiable profile 
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but they were not to be recruiting agents; the example of IDP's ro le in 
Jakarta was in fl uential in th is suggestion (DEET, 1988, p 4). 
The crea tion by Governm ent of the AECs in Jul y 1988 was a major 
breakthrough in the promotion of international education for Australia. 
It brought together two impo rtant ideas which had preoccupied policy 
makers in institutions since the full -fee program had started: how to 
present a 'one-stop shop' for inquirers and how to bu ild on the work 
of individual inst itutional marketing e fforts with a generic promotion 
of Australia a nd its capabilities, preferably in coll aboration with 
gove rnment. The example of the British Council was constantly ta lked 
about; the fact that it did not provide a o ne-stop shop for education or 
provide placeme nt se rvices was not well understood but its network, 
libraries, and reach into education through its teaching of Engli sh 
language, and its promotion of British culture more broadly, were a ll 
envied. There was no will within the Australian Government at the 
time to create an institutionalised cultural presence overseas although 
some senior figures, and the AVCC, were attracted to the idea. Instead 
there was a pragmatic view that the education sector could pay for its 
own promotion. So in December 1989 when the AECs were put o ut 
to tender a nd a consortium of IDP and Qantas won the re was ini tially 
no government subsidy. The AECs were required, in the contract with 
the Government, to provide information on education in Australia for 
inquirers and impartial education cou nselling; liaison with the med ia 
and with educational institutions in the country; and, importantly, the 
processing of applications for study in Austra lia for those institutions 
which subscribed to t his pa rticular service. By 1990, AECs were open in 
Bangkok, H ong Ko ng, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Seoul , Singapore, 
Suva and Ta ipei. To make them financially viable and to comply with 
the contract IDP, in running the AECs, was representing all parts of 
Austra lian edu cation including the private sector. 
It almost seemed that no sooner had the new service started than it 
was being reviewed. T he AVCC and The ELICOS Association were firml y 
of the view that a government partnership with education providers 
would be the best outcome, with the AECs continuing to be run by lDP. 
IDP was, of course, a ssociated with unive rsities and coll eges and there 
was resistance in the private sector to its continuing in volvement. But 
IDP had implemented the 'one-stop shop' idea and the AECs - essentia lly 
a creation of IDP - run in that way had been successful. After a period of 
difficult negotiation t he Government a nnounced in December 1993 the 
crea tion of the Austra lia n International Educati on Foundation (A IEF). 
Henceforth the Australian Governme nt would be directly associated 
with the promotion of edu cation offshore and the act ive marketing by 
Australia's educational institutions was, at last, given a n officia l status. 
IDP would be asked to cede the name 'Australian Education Centre' 
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and access to its institutio na l subscriptions to the new bod y; in retu rn 
ir would be contracted to ru n them in seven countries as well as he 
fi nancia lly compensated. New positions were created in several ADMs 
to coord inate educational promotion and representatio n, and fu nd ing 
was o n the basis of two parrs government to o ne part institutions. T he 
Minister was briefed to argue in Cabinet fo r a four to o ne ra tio but 
there was o pposition to the AIEF proposal fro m the Departmen ts of the 
Treasury and Finance; it was an achievement to gain Cabinet support for 
the AJ EF even o n a two to one fu nding bas is, bu t the com mitment to the 
fund ing reflected a growing awareness o f the econom ic sign ificance of 
international education (Bob Goddard , 201 0, persona l co mmunicatio n). 
T he creation of seven new education positi o ns in ADMs and the 
upg rading of the three D EET posit ions created in 1987 was a major 
achievemen t. The AVCC, in particular, was att racted to the concept 
of the AIEF because it held out the prospect o f wider a nd more senio r 
representation overseas of Aust ralia's culture and science. T he downside 
was the loss o f the 'o ne-stop shop ' idea. T he AIEF did not wish to be 
in competitio n with agents a nd 101; w hich had already developed its 
own office network, bega n to perform agency work on be ha lf of some 
institutions. 
The AlEF was in tended to be a fo rmal counci l of the Natio nal Board 
o f Employment, Ed ucat ion and Tra in ing and to have di rect input from 
key education sectors; it was to be cha ired by a sen ior business leader, 
M r Eric M eyer. This wo uld have given it a degree of independence from 
government and possibly a llowed it to develo p as the wider body w hich 
the AVCC, in particular, had called fo r, but the legisla tion fa iled to pass. 
Some Opposition senato rs doubted the need for such a body and were 
a lso concerned about l OP's a lleged confl ict o f interest in running part 
of the netwo rk w hen it was also acting as an agent. Ins tead the Council 
was created as an advisory body, overseeing the AIEF's operat ions. T his 
body included a range o f represen tatives from a ll secto rs of in ternational 
educatio n, thus giving in st itutio ns some influence in the decisio ns of the 
AIEF. The AlEF was launched with great fanfare in November 1994 and 
most institu tio ns subscribed to its services, but there were doubts about 
its ut ili ty fro m the sta rt. Newspaper articles suggested that unive rsities 
had not been happy with its creatio n and w hile the AVCC denied th is, 
there was a high level o f dissatisfactio n within a ll secto rs of what was 
now increasingly tho ugh t of as an education ' industry' . W ith the election 
of the Howard Government in 1996 the future of the AIEF was in doubt. 
T he Govern ment's cont ribut ion was reduced , withd rawing the two fo r 
o ne funding arrangement, and a review was conducted after which the 
AlEF was abolished, although the Education Counsellor positio ns in 
ADM s remai ned. A replacement body, Australian Education Inte rnational 
(AEI), was created in 1998 with in the Ed ucat ion portfolio to undertake 
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generic international educational promotion overseas. Importantly, AEI 
was to provide a link between this promotion and the Government's 
broader objectives in foreign affa irs and trade. It had, in other words, 
essentially the same mission as the defunct AIEF. 
Offshore, institutions had rapidly learnt how to market by doing it. 
Marketing 'collateral' such as banners and brochures and display units 
became essential accoutrements for travelling academics and sales staff. 
There was a remarkable degree of cooperation among institutions, public 
and private, as well as rivalry. Staff had to learn rapidly how to assess 
qualifications to g ive advice to prospective stude nts . Cou ld an offer of 
a place be made o n the spot in a student interview? Formal co mmittee 
processes at home came under pressure to change; general staff were 
given devolved powers in many cases to make decisions to speed up the 
application process. Austrade eventually withdrew from running trade 
fairs by which time IDP had started to run highly successful road shows 
throughout Asia. T he large shows continued to be popular with students 
and institutions but there were doubts in the university sector about 
By 1993 it was recognised that 
education had in a short period 
become a major export earner 
overtaking wool and wheat. 
being involved in large fairs with private colleges 
offering non-formal training. As a result, state 
consortia were developed to organise university-
specific education fairs. Some of these, CANDIP 
(an o rganisation of university international 
directors in New South Wales and the Australian 
Capital Territo ry) in particular, began to specia lise 
in opening new markets such as the Subcontinent 
a nd the Middle East. By 1993 it was recognised 
that education had in a short period become a major export earner 
overtakjng wool and wheat. 
Recruitment success led to interesting developments in product. 
Some TAFE colleges had created a useful niche in pathway programs into 
degrees at univers ity from their own diplomas. Some private colleges 
developed foundation and pathway programs and universi.ties created 
foundation programs to bu ild on overseas secondary quali fications and 
assist international students in adjusting to the learning requirements of 
first year at an Australian university. Diploma programs were introduced 
by private providers in collaboration with universities, consisting of the 
first year of a uni versity degree, in areas such as business and information 
technology. These provided intensive teaching o ften with additjonal 
language support both before and during the diploma studies. They gave 
a second chance to students who might not otherwise have achieved 
admission to university study. 
A similar motivation influenced the development of offshore 
programs by Australian institutions. Colleges of advanced education had 
led the way using their advantage with materials developed for distance 
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educatio n to provide an extension of their p rograms overseas. Darling 
Downs Insti tu te of Advanced Education partnered with the University of 
the South Pac ific in .198 .I and Warrnarnbool with Kolej Disted in Penang 
in 1986. Other models fo llowed includi ng the vis it of onshore academic 
staff fo r periods of in tensive teaching offshore. The model w hich came 
to characte rise ' transnatio nal education', as it was late r called, was 
the credit transfer model where an overseas college such as Sun way 
in Malaysia taught its own dipl o ma, o ften in acade mic collaboration 
with an overseas institution, and stud en ts were granted credit for that 
award into an Austra lian degree. It had the advantage of cutting the 
cost of obtaining an Austra lian award. Later, in 1993, the fi rst o ffshore 
campus of an Australian uni versi ty was established by the University of 
Wo ll ongong in Dubai, and others were to fo llow, with mi xed success (see 
chapter 9). 
Sector peak bodies lobbied for greater 
regulatio n and the Government responded. 
ln 1991 Parliament passed the first Education 
Services for Overseas Students (Registration of 
Providers and Financial Regulation) Act, known 
by the acronym ESOS . It incorpo rated a code 
of condu ct and was a first att empt to assure 
prospecti ve studen ts that there were p rocesses in 
place to supervise the viability of colleges. The 
new Act was soon tested when a major private 
college in Western Australia, ABC College, 
fa iled. Some 1200 studen ts were left w ithout 
tuition but the 600 international students had 
all pa id their fees in advance. The M inister for 
Employment, Education and Training, Kim 
Beazley, secured fu nding from the Department 
of Finance to help relocate the students in 
a lternative colleges and this was done rapidl y thus preven ting w hat might 
have been a worse scandal (Bob Goddard , personal co mmunicatio n). As 
a resul t ESOS was strengthened wi th th e creatio n of a tuiti o n assurance 
scheme designed to pro tect the pre-paid fees of international students. 
The ELICOS Associa tio n (now Englis h Austra lia), the peak body 
for ELl COS providers, had alread y established a guaran teed student 
placement scheme among its members. ESOS, which some had tho ught 
of as highlighting that exporting educational services was inherently 
risky, was shown to have been best p ractice and a clear message given to 
parents and students overseas that this industry was properly regu lated 
a nd quality outcomes were assured. 
There was sti ll in the earl y period much room for improvement 
in coordination with in the Governme nt and between levels o f 
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government. Which level of governme nt, for instance, was responsible 
for the accred itati on of private non-forma l colleges? Institutions, too, 
had to learn that it was important to keep ADMs informed of their 
marketing plans and to understa nd how the diplomatic mission viewed 
local cond itions. The ma in point of irritation was what appeared to 
institutional representatives as uncooperative visa issuing regimes in 
some ADMs. Large trade missions could generate considerable interest 
in studying in Australia only to find that few s tudents passed the tests 
of bona fides set up by the mission on the basis of long experience with 
visa overstayers. ADMs began to make educational judgements and 
reject student applications that contradicted those of the institution. 
In some cases visa processing took months because applications had 
to be sent to a regional centre; Australia's market rivals- in particular 
the UK -seemed to process applications far more quickly. Sometimes 
there was such a backlog due to lack of staff that with the best will 
in the world it was impossible to give an answer on a visa applicatio n 
quickly. Students missed the start o f term or could not book a flight. 
The answer lay in collaboration and asking institutions to weed out 
applicants not likely to secure a visa. Some universities bid for and were 
awarded Pre-qualified Institution (PQl) status by the Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship. The AlEF and its successor body, the AEI, 
struggled to achieve a whole of government approach to th is issue and 
it was not until a major review of student visa arrangements in 2000 by 
Senator Kay Patterson, then Par liamentary Secretary to the Ministe r for 
Imm igration and Multicultura l Affairs, that these issues were adequately 
addressed. Senator Patte rson herself visited educational institutions to 
ask them how visa issuing could be improved . By then, the industry 
had formed an overarching cross-sectoral forum to facilitate a 
common view, or at least ease of consultation, called th e Affiliation 
of International Education Peak Bodies. There were also complaints 
about the ever-rising cost o f an Australian student visa and a 'pre-visa 
assessment', but no one ever proved that these fees were a disincentive 
to study in Austra lia. 
At ho me there were complaints that state governments did not 
extend travel concessio ns to international students except those 
sponsored by governments o r multilatera l agencies. The policy 
justification of this lay at the heart of the funding arrangements for 
the full -fee program: that there was to be no element of public subsidy 
of these students; government ex penditure on education was only for 
Austra lian permanent residents and those who held scholarships. So 
ended any larger policy justification for the program as contributing to 
the expa nsion of ties between Australia a nd student source countries. 
The full -fee program, in pa rticula r, had gone full circle, through being 
a policy a fte rthought, to being the subject of an intensive review which 
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decid ed it had mer it in aid and foreign relations terms, to being regarded 
purely in terms of its capacity to earn foreign exchange. 
Commercial success and public 
diplomacy 
In fact the full-fee program from its inception contribu ted to Austra lia's 
public image in Asia for good and ill. There were criticisms of Australia's 
policy as be ing too commercia l by some policy makers in the region a nd 
outside. Where were the links for the exchange of students o r research 
collaboration? Exchange p rograms were encouraged a lthough the pull 
of North America and Europe far outweighed the attractions of Asia for 
most und ergraduate Australian students. The success of the University 
Mobility in Asia and the Pacific (UMAP) scheme from 1996 showed what 
cou ld be done with seed funding from govern ment to encourage lin ks 
with Asian institutions, as did the Targeted Institutional Links Program 
w hich encou raged joint projects overseas in applied research. Some 
universiti es started to send teams of academic research staff to build 
links with counterparts in Asia and managing de legatio ns from foreign 
institutions became a no rmal part of life in many Austral ian educatio nal 
bodies. T here was an increase in media reports about developments 
in Austra lian education, in particular in newspapers in Malays ia and 
Singapore. judgements about wh ich institution to send students to 
became well informed, if only because the commitment to education 
overseas by fam ilies required considerabl e outlay. 
An earl y corrective to the domestic and in ternati onal crit icism o f the 
program as overly comme rcial was a statement in September 1992 by 
the Ministe r for Employment, Education and Training, Kim Beazley. The 
statement introduced the terms ' internationalisation' and 'international ' 
as reflectors of a more open and regionally engaged education system . 
As well as accepting international students, Australian education was 
now making its courses and teaching methods more in ternationally 
competitive through links with businesses, governments and institutio ns 
overseas. T here were three contexts for judging Australia's international 
educatio nal activity: whether it deli vered quality education at home; 
how it contributed to Au stralia's diplomatic and trade relations ; and 
how it assisted Australia's economic performance. Australia's reputati on 
overseas had been damaged by abuses of the migration program and the 
failure of some private colleges, which had over-extended themselves in 
a rush ro expand the marker. All institutions were implicitly c riticised for 
a lack of coordina tio n in their overseas marketing, a theme which would 
be rnon: insistent from government as the decade went o n. ]n short, the 
sta tement was both an attempt to face the problems that had a risen in the 
first years o f the program and an o utline of the broader context in which 
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it wou ld prosper in the future (Beazley, 1992). 
Nonetheless the very commercial success of the program swamped 
other concerns. It grew beyond all expectations in the 1990s. Between 
1992-93 and 2000-01 earnings from the export of Australian 
educational services across all sectors rose by 150 percent to $4.2 billi on 
(DEST, 2002, p 3) an d income from fees became essen tial to instituti ons 
by the mid-1990s. Between 1994 and 2000 there was an increase of 85 
percent in nu mbers onshore to approximately 153 000 and in 2000 the 
top source coun tr ies were Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and C hina, in that order (DEST, 2002, pp 18-19). T he rapid growth 
in numbers had some institutions scrambling to provide appropriate 
support on campus and there were inevitably complain ts about students 
who existed entire ly in a home language environment and whose English 
language skills were not adequ ate. l nternationa lisation had occurred 
at the level of teaching and adm inistrati on, and an awareness of the 
importance of managing relations with sou rce countries effectively had 
developed. In th e award program classroom teachers were often faced 
with an entirely international cohort and this required an awareness 
of different ways of learning and different teaching styles. Austra lian 
In fact the full-fee program from its 
inception con tributed to Australia's 
pub lic image in Asia for good and ill. 
students may have be nefi ted from better facili ties 
o n campus paid for by internati onal fee income, 
but it is doubtfu l whether their learning in 
class was in any sense ' internationali sed '. T he 
shee r numbers of in ternation al students meant 
that class in te raction often fai led and attempts 
a t in ternationalised cu rricula stu mbled on the 
requirements of professiona l accred iting bodies for 
particular trancl1es of knowledge delivered without 
the capacity to increase teaching hours. 
In the last decade, the link between ed ucation 
and im migration motives made explicit in 2001lecl to major growth in 
all sectors, bu t especially in privately run co lleges providing vocational 
education (see chapter 8). It also led to a change in the character of the 
market. The countries on which Australian institutions had buil t their 
markets- M alaysia, Singapore and H ong Kong, in particular- decreased 
in re lative impor tance to C hina and India . Most institutions had been 
concerned, from the beginni ng of the program, to have a wide diversity 
of countries represented in their classrooms. This was seen as good for 
classroom dynamics including encouraging the use of English informa ll y. 
It was also prudent business practice to spread risk. T he dominance 
of China and India, and the narrowness of the marketing pitch, based 
on security and price, meant that Australian ins titu tions were exposed 
should costs increase or violence against students become an issue. Both 
happened in 2009. 
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The rapid growth in num bers of international students led , however, 
to the provision o f mo re housing for the m especiall y in inner-city areas. 
Developers built apartment blocks sometimes in collabo ration with 
institutions specifically designed for them and their v isiting families . 
Goods and services sprung up catering to the needs of international 
students but having the benefit o f adding to the diversity of life around 
institutions. 
For the Austra lia n Government, the growth in internationa l student 
numbers in Australia meant that educati onal links were a vira l pa rt 
of developing a bilateral relationship. Once these matte rs might have 
been relegated to the desk of the third secretary in an ADM; now they 
preoccupied the head of missio n as they tried to build a constituency 
for Austra lia. If Australia's o rganised program of cultura l links with 
Asian countries, its publi c diplomacy, inevitably impacted only eli te 
decision-makers, the student program reached wide into the homes 
of middle-class families in the region who now had a more informed 
view of Australia. The growth in migration and tourism on the back 
of the student program meant that far greater numbers of citi zens had 
a reason to be interested in Australia . From being o n the edge o f the 
Asian landmass in 1950 both cultura lly and in terms of fo reign policy, 
by 2000 Austra lia had demonstrated that it could adapt wi th fl air to 
the aspirations of the people of the region and in the process begin to 
change itself. 
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